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Ever since the October Revolution and the suc-
cessful overthrow of the Kerensky government in
Russia, the Communists in that country have char-
acterized themselves as "champions of international
peace," In support of this contention they have
called upon the world to view the array o f peace
notes, appeals and declarations, records of con-
ferences on inter-war problems and disarmament,
treaties and pacts of neutrality and non-aggres-
sion which the Soviet government has either sup-
ported or entered into over the years. The purpose
of this paper is to review the record o f Soviet
diplomacy, in order to throw some light on the
USSR'S attitude toward the international settle-
ment of disputes.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated and shown
in practioe a preference for bilateral talks as a
means of settling disputes. This has been exem-
plified in many conciliation treaties. During the
years that the USSR was weak and afraid of being
crushed, it sought security through negotiation(1920-21), international conferences (1922-25),
political agreements (1925-31), connection with the
French alliance system (1932), the League of Na-
tions .(1934-39 ), and Hitler (1939-41),
On the other hand, thereare onlya few examples
of acceptance by the Russians of mediation offers
from other countries. The Allied Powers invited
the Bolsheviks to Prinkipo in January, 1919, for
a conference that would conclude the civilwar then
raging in Russia . The Soviets immediately aocepted
by radiogram. (8:294) This meeting failed to bring
about peace.
A second attempt was made in March, 1919» when
William Bullittunofficially represented the Uni-
ted States on a trip to Moscow for the purpose of
determining the possibility of acceptable terms to
both the Soviets and their enemies. The former
signed a draft treaty, thus showing their willing-
ness to conclude peace with the anti-Bolshevik
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forces. (8 :294) The agreement never went into
effect.
A third example under this same category was
the Soviet acceptance of a 1^26 French o ffer to
mediate a dispute with Switzerland. The trouble
arose from the assassination of a Bolshevik diplo-
mat. The Russians agreed to remove their boycott
of Switzerland, providing that the latter met oer-
tain conditions.
The USSR has not acoepted any other offers of
mediation.
Another method of settling international dis-
putes involves commissions of inquiry. A definite
procedure for this was established at the Hague
Conferences of 18^9 and 1907. The Soviets have
never resorted to such fact-finding commissions.
The reason fo r this negative attitude wa s explained
by '?axim Litvinov ina 1922 speech to a conference
at the Hague.
Commander Hilton Young has asked whether
it is impossible to find an impartial judge
in the whole world. It must be established
first that there exist not one but two worlds:
The Soviet and the non-Soviet. • • » • One
party (to a dispute) willpropose a Commu-
nist judge, like the chairman of the Third
International; the other party perhaps the
head of the League o f Nations • • • Maybe
only an angel could solve the Russian prob-
lem. . . . (4:43)
i^ven USSR satellites have been candid in their
criticism .regarding international commissions 0 f
inquiry .±.1 Neither the Soviet Union nor its Bal-
kan satellites (Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria)per-
mitted United Nations commissions to enter terri-
tories under their control during the civil vrar in
Greece. A similar refusal met the later attempt
by U.N. representatives when they attempted to per-
form their legal duties in North Korea to bring
about free elections.
The Russians prefer diplomatic action or even
commissions of conciliation to the quasi- judicial
process of arbitration. They welcome arbitration
only for commercial disputes on questions involv-
ing the conflict of laws, i.e., private internation-
al law. (1:111)
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Again the reason for this attitude has been made
quite clear by Soviet writers:
The necessary minimum and basic premise
for any arbitration is a community of mind
on legal principles. Insofar as such a com-
munity is lacking, any attempt to seoure an
impartial authority for two parts of human-
ity that speak such different languages is _a
priori hopeless. (4:4 7 )
In other words, there are no impartial states
when a question involves differing economic sys-
tems according to the Communists. The ides of com-
pulsory arbitration by third parties, therefore,
has always been opposed by the USSR. The follow-
ing exceptions only tend to substantiate this rule.
Ina treaty signed by the Soviets with the pro-
letarian government o f Finland on 1March 1918,
compulsory arbitration was among the provisions*
Both parties to the agreement were, however, wor-
kers' states. Also, the arbitrator was to be se-
lected from the proletarian party of Sweden.
In December 1922, the Russ ians accepted the prin-
ciple o f international arbitration for political
disputes with non-Socialist states, under the con-
dition that a simultaneous agreement for disarma-
ment be signed. (3:121) It was probably known to
the USSR in advance, however, that the capitalist
states would not accept the latter stipulation.
Most of the treaties of conciliation, signed by
the USSR between the two World Wars, contain pro-
vis ions for mixed commissions. AllRussian treaties
of this type are restricted by the provision that
if agreement is not reached through conciliation,
then no further obligation rests on the parties.
The conciliation commissions have equal represen-
tation from both sides and are without a neutral
chairman.
Soviet conventions for conciliation procedure






parties, whioh cannot be settled through regular
diplomatic channels within a reasonable length of
time. Some of these treaties contain explicit res-
ervations. One is found in the convention with
Poland, which precludes the applicability of con-
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oiliationto disputes conoerning territorial ques-
tions.
Some Soviet treaties provide that precedence be
given to special procedures established by previous
agreements binding upon the parties. If such spe-
cial procedures are provided for in these other
agreements, the disputes falling under their pro-
visions are not approaohed in accordance with the
convent ion for conciliation prooedure, but» instead,
are handled in conformity with the provisions of
the special agreement,.?'
Many of the treaties signed by the USSR provided
for the appointment of different commissioners for
each session of the commission, despite the fact
that the commissions established by these treaties
meet periodically. They are, in a sense, more per-
manent than the no-called "permanent 11 commissions
constituted by other treaties, which seldom ifever
oonvene •
Each of the countries appoints two persons from
among its own nationals. The sessions are presided
over by one of the nationals of the party in whose
territory the commission is sitting. Meetings are
held alternately in the capitals of the two states.
A session usually lasts fourteen or fifteen days
and is held toward the middle of eaoh year.
Under the system of annual sessions, no appli-
cations are necessary, except when one of the coun-
tries demands an extraordinary session. In that
case, the party requesting the meeting must inform
the other party of the "urgent circumstances" oc-
casioning the request, V7ith regard to ordinary
meetings, each state shall "communicate to the
other, through the diplomatic channel, the list of
questions which it is desired should be dealt with
at the session" (identical in all treaties).
Often experts appointed by the parties are al-
lowed to sit with the commission as advisors. The
conciliation commission usually decides the pro-
cedure of its meetings. Any person is heard, whose
evidence is deemed to be useful. The countries are
obligated to furnish the commission with all data
and assistance found to be necessary.
Allmembers must be present for the proceedings.
Most treaties require a unanimous decision. The
commission submits a joint report on all disputes
referred to it as well as a consolidated settle-
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ment proposal on the basis of interpretations that
must be sound at law. (9tl4) It usually recom-
mends that its proposals be aooepted by the two
parties through diplomatic channels. The High Con-
tracting Parties are bound to inform each other
within ninety days as t o whether they accept the
proposals.
There have been some examples of mixed commis-
sions established for a speoific purpose. One was
set up to map the Soviet—Afghanistan boundary by a
convention betweenthe two states. (13*4) The Com-
mission had three persons from each side and was
empowered to decide the ownership of islands. Its
report was subject to approval by the two High Con-
tracting Parties. A similar mixed border commis-
sion was provided for the following year in an
agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland.(14)
Somewhat different from the preceding disous-
sion is the matter of commercial arbitration which
arises from disputes between non-Communist indi-
viduals or corporations on the one hand and Sov ie t
state trading corporations on the other. As suoh,
it concerns only one state directly
—
the USSR.
The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in the
All-Union Chamber of Commerce was established in
Moscow by a decree of 17 June 1932. (2:10) Soviet
agencies transacting business inthe Jnited States,
for example, always include a clause in their con-
tracts with American corporations which provides
that arbitration willtake place only before this
Soviet Commission in Moscow. All decisions are
final and binding.
A post-war trade agreement with Poland contains
a similar provision. Article XIof this agreement,
which was signed on 2 February 1946, by the Min-
ister of Navigation and Foreign Trade of Poland and
the Foreign Trade Board of the Soviet MilitaryAd-
ministration in Germany reads as follows:
Alldisputes arising out of the present
contract or in connection with it shall be
subjected to the pronouncements of an arbi-
tration commission attached to the All-Soviet
Chamber of Commerce in Moscow whose decision
is final and obligatory for both parties. (6)
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The most famous case of commercial arbitration
was perhaps that between the Lena. Goldfields Com-
pany, Ltd. and. the USSR, The type of arbitration
agreed upon here was different from the foregoing
illustrations. The Soviets bound themselves in p.
contract to have a three-mar, arbitral comrr.iss ion.
consisting ofa national from each side a.nd a neu-
tral umpire ..2/ The USSR eventually withdrew its
Commissioner, Dr. Chlenov , and never paid the
13,000.000 pounds Sterling which wa s later adjudi-
cated as damages.
It would seem that experiences of this type havs
proven to the Russians that they cannot rely on any
third party to see matters from their point of view.
Therefore, the Communists now keep to their 07;n For-
eign Trade Arbitration Commission, where they are
certain that the verdict will always be made in ac-
cordance with their wishes.
FOOTNOTES
1.' "You observe that nowadays Commissions e.re per-
fected instruments for painting given situ-
ations in the colors desired by their mas-
ters. Our (United Nations ) Commissions re-
flect the ma jority that has been formed hero.
They d o the work which the masters of that
majority give them to do, and Ithink that
this provides a further extension of the par-
allel between Greece and Korea,, The Commis-
sion which you dispatch willhave a ma jority
that willbe a reflection of the majority in
the Assembly." Speech by Bebler (Yugoslavia)
in "Consideration of Dispatch of a Commission
. to Korea by the General Assembly. 1
' (ll:lll)
.£' "The prooedure laid down in the Polish-Soviet
Agreement of August 3> 1925, for settlement
of frontier disputes shall remain in force.
I Should
they not have been settled amioably
by means laid_down in the above-mentioned
agreement > /i. e« through direct bilateral
negot iations_"7 either Contracting Party r iy
refer them to the Conciliation Commission
provided for in the present artiole..'' USSR-
I Poland, 23 November, 1932. (5)2J The three men were Sir Leslie Scott, Dr. S. B ,
Chlenov, and umpire Prof essor Otto Stutzer.fr)
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